ABSTRACT This article addresses the growing literature in critical race studies, which holds that racism is permanent or incurable, and that by adopting this pessimistic view of racism, we can enact improved and healthier racialized lives. I argue that the focus on curing anti-Black racism, and the failure to do so in the civil rights era and its aftermath has left people of all races, to varying degrees, stuck in pessimistic states of racialized anger, resentment, guilt, and shame. These pessimistic (...) states have brought about an additional level of oppression for targets of racialized oppression. I call it “meta-oppression,” and it is the oppression of being oppressed. I argue that this oppression has exacerbated the effects of the social disease of racism, and it has literally affected the physiologies of many African Americans. This article provides a diagnosis of these existential and physiological states of meta-oppression and a clarification of its characteristics. This diagnosis is an initial step in a larger project of formulating and enacting effective treatments for it. I then argue that meta-oppression is a helpful diagnostic tool for clarifying the characteristics and ramifications on Blacks of US systemic racism during the post–civil rights movement period. I aim to establish meta-oppression as an existential and physiological condition that requires attention so as to expand the social imaginations of people of color and to allow us to engage in more systemic joyful affirmations of our racialized lives while still living within racist conditions. (shrink)

For thousands of years communication has functioned principally by means of linguistic and iconic messages. In the first case linguistic symbols serve as intermediaries; in the second, images or, more broadly, representations. In order to be transmitted, linguistic and/or iconic symbols need to be re-produced, re-presented, vocally, through writing, painting, sculpture or any other means of re-production. But re-production requires a space that, through use of an appropriate material, serves as its medium; forms to occupy it; rules to control it, (...) and a certain stability. In other words representation is impossible without a certain fixity of the message that alone can ensure its duration, whether short or long being unimportant, but which it needs precisely in order to function as a message. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article, presented in January 2020 to the North American Nietzsche Society at the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meeting, is a commentary on Andrew Huddleston's 2019 monograph, Nietzsche on the Decadence and Flourishing of Culture. The focus is on Nietzsche's critical and positive arguments about the psychological and physiological nature of decadence, Nietzsche's conception of cultural health, and the role of art and artists in Nietzschean flourishing cultures.

Subjects enrolled in studies testing high risk interventions for incurable or progressive brain diseases may be vulnerable to deficiencies in informed consent, such as the therapeutic misconception. However, the definition and measurement of the therapeutic misconception is a subject of continuing debate. Our qualitative pilot study of persons enrolled in a phase I trial of gene transfer for Parkinson disease suggests potential avenues for both measuring and preventing the therapeutic misconception. Building on earlier literature on the topic, we developed and (...) tested an interview guide that focuses on how the subjects decided to participate, emphasizing the integration of subjects’ various statements that are relevant to assessing the therapeutic misconception, rather than evaluating them as isolated statements. The results indicate that a subject’s understanding of the purpose of research is best explored in juxtaposition to the subject’s motivation for participating. (shrink)

Bioethicists have long been concerned that seriously ill patients entering early phase (‘phase I’) treatment trials are motivated by therapeutic benefit even though the likelihood of benefit is low. In spite of these concerns, consent forms for phase I studies involving seriously ill patients generally employ indeterminate benefit statements rather than unambiguous statements of unlikely benefit. This seeming mismatch between attitudes and actions suggests a need to better understand research ethics committee members’ attitudes toward communication of potential benefits and risks (...) of early phase studies to potential subjects. We surveyed the members of two U.S. research ethics committees using a phase I gene transfer study scenario, and compared the results to a previous survey of potential subjects’ perceptions and attitudes toward benefit and risk for the same protocol. The results show that there is indeed a gap between the subjects’ perceptions and the committee members’ views on what is appropriate to be communicated to research subjects. This discrepancy is the product of both the commonly assumed optimism of the subjects and to a “protective pessimism” of the research ethics committee members. We discuss this discrepancy using “frameworks of trust” and demonstrate the need to incorporate these frameworks into the existing model of informed consent. (shrink)

At first glance such a title seems antinomic. Obviously we accept the fact that there exists a relation, frequently conflictual, between the press and public authority, without mentioning other media; but art continues to represent, at least in the mind of the public, a privileged domain which, though subject to frequently abrupt and brutal changes, benefits nevertheless from an “innocence” distinguishing it from other activities. Visiting the Louvre in Paris, the Uffizi in Florence, or touring the Loire valley châteaux are (...) all so-called cultural activities pursued “simply to develop the personality.”. (shrink)

Richard Wagner always represented for Nietzsche the Germany of that time. By examining Nietzsche's relationship to Wagner throughout his writings, one is also examining Nietzsche's relationship to his culture of birth. I focus on the writings from the late period in order to clarify Nietzsche's view of his own project regarding German culture. I show that Nietzsche created a portrait of Wagner in which the composer was a worthy opponent-someone with whom he disagreed but viewed as an equal. Wagner was (...) such an opponent because he represented the disease of decadence which plagued the culture and from which Nietzsche suffered for a time, but of which he also cured himself. In other words, Nietzsche emphasized his overcoming and revaluation of Wagner because he wanted his readers to understand it as a metaphor for his larger battle with decadence in general. The goal of this portraiture is to demonstrate on an individual level what could be done on a cultural level to revitalize culture. Through an analysis of Nietzsche's portrait of Wagner in the late period, I will claim that in order to understand Nietzsche's revaluation of decadent values in nineteenth century German culture, one must understand his relationship with the composer. (shrink)

_Explores convergences between the ideas of Friedrich Nietzsche and African American thought._.

The creation of moralities is necessary for the enhancement of the species, yet, the assigning of values is a sign of decadence. According to Nietzsche, this is the problem of decadence with which human beings (in particular philosophers) must contend: they must place a value on life, but placing a value on life (even on one's individual life) is problematic because it involves fracturing the whole of life into pieces. The primary objective in this paper is to address Nietzsche's own (...) battle with the problem of decadence as it applies to individuals. I will argue that in this battle, Nietzsche carried out a revaluation of decadence and transformed himself into a strong decadent. In calling himself a strong decadent, Nietzsche not only admitted to his own decadence, but also provided himself as an example for how other strong types might contend with the problem of decadence. (shrink)

I am, by profession, a “literary scholar”, in contrast to “scientists”. More precisely, I am a specialist in ancient Greek literature. Yet, in an age such as ours in which so often there is discussion of the standing of the various academic disciplines, of the differences implied by their methods and their needs, and of the means for making them work together, it seems to me more and more that very serious confusion is tending to becloud some essential definitions: that (...) of the study of literature in general, but even prior to that, the very definition of literature itself. It is very important to reach some understanding if we hope to avoid losing the richness of research and the very vitality of culture in the broadest sense of the term. (shrink)

In our times changes occur so rapidly that our modes of reading even more than our modes of analysis risk being inadequate, or in any case risk lagging behind. If we wish to analyze relations between the arts and the media, the danger is in fact that we will limit ourselves to established notions or even to stereotypes which are commonly accepted by the general public. Even for persons with some awareness, information remains lacunary. Moreover, like the experts, or those (...) who pass for such, it seems that it is difficult for them to avoid a personal conception, implicit or avowed, which does not fail to influence their judgement. This is almost always the case when the matter of art is raised, even if we take the precaution of placing the term in the plural. Whether one wishes to or not, there is hardly an example where certain preferences do not make themselves known. If it is easy to reach agreement with regard to the facts, it is less easy to agree on their interpretation, especially when values are at stake. Hence the necessity to proceed by different steps and explanations to explain the relationships between arts and the media. (shrink)

In _René Girard and Secular Modernity: Christ, Culture, and Crisis_, Scott Cowdell provides the first systematic interpretation of René Girard’s controversial approach to secular modernity. Cowdell identifies the scope, development, and implications of Girard’s thought, the centrality of Christ in Girard's thinking, and, in particular, Girard's distinctive take on the uniqueness and finality of Christ in terms of his impact on Western culture. In Girard’s singular vision, according to Cowdell, secular modernity has emerged thanks to the Bible’s exposure of (...) the cathartic violence that is at the root of religious prohibitions, myths, and rituals. In the literature, the psychology, and most recently the military history of modernity, Girard discerns a consistent slide into an apocalypse that challenges modern ideas of romanticism, individualism, and progressivism._ In the first three chapters, Cowdell examines the three elements of Girard’s basic intellectual vision and brings this vision to a constructive interpretation of “secularization” and “modernity,” as these terms are understood in the broadest sense today. Chapter 4 focuses on modern institutions, chiefly the nation state and the market, that function to restrain the outbreak of violence. And finally, Cowdell discusses the apocalyptic dimension of Girard's theory in relation to modern warfare and terrorism. Here, Cowdell engages with the most recent writings of Girard and applies them to further conversations in cultural theology, political science, and philosophy. Cowdell takes up and extends Girard’s own warning concerning an alternative to a future apocalypse: “What sort of conversion must humans undergo, before it is too late?” "Scott Cowdell's book is the first comprehensive study of modernity and secularity in René Girard's thought. Cowdell brings Girard's theory into a fruitful dialogue with leading approaches on secularization like those of Max Weber, Hans Blumenberg, Peter Berger, and Charles Taylor. Scholars and students of theology, philosophy, and sociology will benefit from this wide-ranging overview of the relationship between religion, modernity, and secularization." — Wolfgang Palaver, Institute of Systematic Theology, University of Innsbruck __ "In a stunning analysis, Cowdell shows that Girard’s sustained intellectual pursuit, which began in the 1960s with his mimetic analysis of modern realist fiction, has always been about the religiosity of the modern and postmodern social condition, even when it has dealt explicitly with the religious origins of antique culture. Cowdell demonstrates the 'highly explanatory and predictive' quality of Girard’s cultural anthropology, within which the 'secular' does not escape the 'religious.' This is a powerful book." — Ann W. Astell, University of Notre Dame __ "Scott Cowdell is one of the most interesting theological voices of his generation. The themes in Cowdell's work are always cosmic and vast in scope. This is a remarkable reading of our contemporary situation through the lens of René Girard. Accurate, informed, and illuminating, Cowdell has written a fabulous book. For the person needing a way into Girard and for the person who is already using Girard's work, Cowdell brings out the implications of Girard for the moment in which we live. An absolutely essential addition to your personal library." — The Very Rev Dr. Ian Markham, Virginia Theological Seminary_. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Imitation, Mirror Neurons, and Mimetic Desire:Convergence Between the Mimetic Theory of René Girard and Empirical Research on ImitationScott R. GarrelsIntroductionUntil recently, the pervasive and primordial role of imitation in human life was either largely ignored or misunderstood by empirical researchers. This is no longer the case. It is now clear that investigations on human imitation are among the most profound and revolutionary areas of research contributing to the future (...) of a more unified and coherent understanding of the cognitive and social sciences. This ever-growing body of research has profound implications for a better understanding of the development and structure of human psychosocial functioning as well as cultural evolution, yet current applications lack insight into two essential aspects of human imitation: (1) its elemental role in generating uniquely human forms of relational competition, rivalry, and violence; and (2) the historical and anthropological role of religious /cultural beliefs and practices in transforming the effects of human imitation into viable and sustainable communities. Rene Girard's Mimetic Theory offers empirical researchers an already elaborated explanatory model that illuminates the way in which imitation is foundational to these universal human phenomena. Yet astonishingly, there have been no substantial studies concerning the critical question of human imitation that have applied and synthesized recent empirical research with the mimetic theory of human motivation and religious and cultural evolution.The initiation of such a detailed and comparative analysis is essential to understanding not only the historical relationship between culture and religion (and ultimately the evolution of the human species) but perhaps more importantly the pressing and complex relationship between violence, religion, and contemporary society. The mimetic theory of religion helps bring to light the mechanisms of social mimesis that produce the self-other distortions characteristic of behaviors ranging from primitive sacrificial rituals to the abhorred [End Page 47] atrocities of recent history; yet it also fundamentally elucidates the creative and historical role of the religious and cultural insights and practices based on human mimetic dynamics that continue to be indispensable in fostering alternative, nonviolent forms of progress and social cooperation in our contemporary world.The purpose of this article, then, is to advance the interdisciplinary dialogue first embarked on by Jean-Michel Oughourlian (1982), and continued in more detail by Eugene Webb (1993), concerning the convergence between empirical research on imitation and René Girard's theory of psychological mimesis. Psychological mimesis1 is the tendency of human beings to imitate the gestures, behaviors, intentions, and desires of other persons; it is the very cornerstone upon which the entire work of Girard is constructed. From this foundation, Girard has made a number of bold claims about human nature and the resulting origin and structure of human culture and religion. Girard's work is immense in scope and has far reaching implications across such diverse disciplines as anthropology, primitive religion, psychology, literary analysis, theology, and philosophy. Any theory attempting to cover this much ground will undoubtedly draw an enormous amount of criticism, and Girard's work has been no exception. Regardless of this, "Girard's hypotheses about the pragmatics of imitative interaction, and more specifically, about the influence of imitation on motivation, represent a unique and significant contribution that merits a careful examination" (Livingston 1992, xvi).The ability of mimetic theory to effectively address the various disciplines it claims to interpret will depend significantly upon its capacity to clarify and validate the primordial role of mimesis in psychosocial development and functioning. Webb (1993) has emphasized that while Girard's work has many broader anthropological and historical implications, the most essential aspect of his theory is that of psychological mimesis. On this point Webb concluded:Thus there is good reason to think not only that [psychological mimesis] deserves a careful hearing but also that it should prove widely useful for psychologists in providing an explanatory framework for the sorts of systematic relationship that many are currently investigating.(213)While Paisley Livingston (1992) has attempted a systematic presentation of Girard's ideas on mimesis, to my knowledge the "careful hearing" that Webb called for has not taken place through an engagement with the empirical sciences. This is remarkable when one considers the enormous output of imitation research... (shrink)

The fatal on-field head injury and subsequent death in Sydney of 25-year-old professional cricketer Phillip Hughes has led to an exceptional outpouring of shock and grief throughout Australia, the cricketing world, and beyond. It was not just one more death. Not even the particular poignancy of a promising young life cut brutally short can account for the reaction.There were heartfelt tributes from players, prime ministers, and presidents. Parliament observed a minute’s silence. The Queen sent a private message to Hughes’s parents. (...) Schoolboy cricketers formed guards of honor and wore black armbands. One batsman paused as his run tally reached 63 to kiss his own black armband (63 was as far as Hughes got before his.. (shrink)

Throughout his career, René Girard consistently positioned his mimetic theory as a far more cohesive account of the wide range of phenomena previously addressed by Sigmund Freud, from the nature of human desire all the way to the origin and structure of human culture and religion. Subsequent theories that took shape in psychoanalysis after Freud were not a part of Girard's ongoing discourse for at least two main reasons: Psycho-analysis was seen as a misguided endeavor with fundamentally incompatible concepts and (...) philosophical assumptions, and as psychoanalysis seemed only to be going further in one direction—focusing on the intrapsychic mechanisms of the individual unconscious—Girard's interests went in... (shrink)

Nineteenth century Christian thought about self and relationality was stamped by the reception of Kant’s groundbreaking revision to the Cartesian cogito. For René Descartes (1596-1650), the self is a thinking thing (res cogitans), a simple substance retaining its unity and identity over time. For Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), on the other hand, consciousness is not a substance but an ongoing activity having a double constitution, or two moments: first, the original activity of consciousness, what Kant would call original apperception, and second, (...) the reflected self, the “I think” as object of reflection. Both are essential to the possibility of an awareness of a unified experience. Such an awareness is achieved only insofar as the self is capable of reflecting on its activity of thinking. As such, the possibility of self-consciousness, or the capacity to reflect on one’s own acts of thought is essential to the constitution of the self. This new model of the mind became the starting point to the thought of central 19th century figures such as Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), J. G. Fichte (1762-1814), Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) and Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855). This chapter will explore their reception of Kant’s model of self-consciousness, the controversies surrounding its development and exposition, and the advantages of this model for theological reflection. The idea of mind as essentially capable of reflection provided an account of how the self can stand in an ontologically immediate relation to God constitutive of the self, while at the same time allowing that the self’s consciousness of itself is distinct from this original moment, so that a limited or false consciousness of self is possible. As such the task of the self is to recognize (that is, to realize in and through self-consciousness) who it most truly is, both in relation to God, and in relation to self and other. (shrink)

When originally published in 1952, this book filled a gap in the history of philosophy and science and remains an important work today, because it puts the main mathematical and physical discoveries of Descartes in an accessible form, for the benefit of English readers. Descartes is acknowledged to be the founder of modern mathematics, through his invention of analytical geometry and this volume charts Descartes’ role in bringing a unity into algebra and geometry and the development of mathematics into a (...) discipline which could be properly analysed. Carefully paraphrasing the Géométrie, this volume retains much of Descartes’ original notation as well as the original diagrams. The volume also discusses the considerable contribution that Descartes made to the physical sciences which involved accurate work in optics, light, sight and colour. (shrink)

Photomontage, the combining of two or more negatives, can be traced back to the 1850s. Scott Mutter is a modern master of the art. His subtle images have enthralled viewers in exhibitions and galleries, mainly in the Midwest, for a decade. "The response has been overwhelming," curator Martin Krause commented of an exhibition at the Indianapolis Museum of Art. "I've had people calling me on the telephone telling me what a great show this is. That happens so rarely. For (...) whatever reason, Scott's work is connecting with people." In the past year his work has attracted attention nationwide, and his posters are now available in galleries from coast to coast. Richly and immediately accessible, yet deeply resonant, Mutter's photomontages provoke strong responses: curiosity, awe, laughter, and then contemplation. They are creative fusions of elements that draw us irresistibly to look again at what first appears unbelievable. Boundaries dissolve miraculously; the impossible becomes seductively tangible. But the logic of his images is exact, reasoned - in his own term, "surrational." Although his work shares the recursive wit of Rene Magritte and M. C. Escher, Mutter never relies simply upon ironic effects. With precision and authority his art explores the ideals and mythologies of our culture, history, language, and art, both lamenting and celebrating contemporary civilization. "From the very beginning," states Mutter, "I tried to make images that people would find accessible and exciting. Art is no idle thing; people want to see something and be held in wonder." In short, he is a master at turning a glance into a gaze. In his foreword Martin Krause reviews the hundred-year history of photomontage and examines Mutter's unparalleled influence within that tradition. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Flight of DesireThe Conversion of Sherman AlexieScott Richard Lyons (bio)Sherman Alexie's audacious arrival onto the Native American literary scene in the early 1990s felt like the start of something new—but it was also the end of something old: namely, the Native American Renaissance (NAR).1 Younger by a generation than the graying canonized figures of preceding decades—N. Scott Momaday, James Welch, Leslie Marmon Silko, Gerald Vizenor, among others—Alexie assumed (...) the pose of an enfant terrible and suggested that his elders were trying a bit too hard to produce an ultimately inauthentic sense of traditionalism. "We've been stuck in place since House Made of Dawn," he complained to an interviewer in 1997.2 Rather than presenting his readers with sick and/or depressed Indians caught between two worlds who discover healing in cultural restoration—the dominant plotline of NAR novels—Alexie's innovative characters played basketball and blues guitar, obsessed about their crushes and classes, and worried more about fitting into the modern world than healing it with some spiritual return to ancient Indian wisdom. Stylistically and thematically, Alexie was always closer to the likes of a George Saunders or Junot Diaz than he was to the serious modernists who had [End Page 27] inspired his NAR predecessors, and his political outlook more closely resembled the "identity politics" of younger Indian academics than the "sovereignty" discourses of twentieth-century tribal councils. Alexie wielded humor and pathos to great effect and always seemed to have his finger on the pulse of newer audiences, including those of us who call Indian reservations home. Alexie's influence on everyday Native American culture has been underestimated.Born to Salish parents in 1966 and raised on and off an eastern Washing-ton reservation, Alexie has published (as of this writing) twenty-six books of poetry, fiction, and memoir, much of which has been lauded for its dark humor and tender compassion in the face of serious and challenging topics—sexual abuse, chemical addiction, parental abandonment—as well as for its "reservation realism": the sense, often reiterated by Alexie himself, that his work speaks more authentically to real Indian life than most Native American works. His first published fiction was a collection of short stories, The Lone Ranger and Tonto Fistfight in Heaven (1993), followed two years later by his first novel, Reservation Blues (1995). In 1996 Alexie published his second novel, Indian Killer, which moved in a different, darker direction. Departing reservation settings for the city of Seattle and supplanting his humor with a horror sensibility, Indian Killer is about a serial murderer who scalps his white male victims and the subsequent racial tensions that arise. In keeping with Alexie's identity politics, a significant theme of the novel is "ethnic fraud"—the claiming of false Indian identity by non-Indians—a topic that received serious treatment during the 1990s and that supplies another layer of meaning to the novel's title.3 But Indian Killer is primarily about the murder of white men, and the most that anyone could say about the moral questions it raises is that Alexie seems to have left them for the reader to decide. Arnold Krupat decided to call Indian Killer a "warning to whites."4 A decade later, Alexie published two short books, each having a foothold in the lucrative young adult (YA) genre: The Absolutely True Diary of a Part-Time Indian (2007) and Flight (2007). The former was immensely successful, critically and commercially, while the latter has barely been written about at all and has not sold as well. What explains this difference? Is True Diary simply a better book than Flight?Whenever we identify some literary text as good, great, better—or worse—than some other texts, we are obliged to answer the big, implicit question: What makes literature good? For René Girard, the answer to that question was simple: Great literature always announces the "novelistic [romanesque] truth," not the "romantic [romantique] lie" about the mediation of mimetic desire.5 The truth is that our desires are never just our own. We always imitate the desires of others, which leads to mimetic rivalry with those same models, who... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Girardian Critique of the Liberal Democratic Peace TheoryKyle Scott (bio)IntroductionRené Girard is unfamiliar to most political scientists, but the liberal democratic peace theory (LDPT) is known by almost all in the discipline. René Girard has developed a theory of the origin and perpetuation of violence that is well known to scholars in literature, anthropology, and theology. Girard’s theory can be adapted to the LDPT in order to (...) provide a causal explanation for the empirical evidence that finds democracies do not go to war with one another. Without understanding why democracies do not fight one another, the LDPT is only an empirical artifact. Uncovering a causal explanation, if one exists, can help lead researchers to unravel the paradox of why democracies do not go to war with one another but are just as war prone as nondemocracies. In addition to unraveling this paradox, understanding the causal link between peace and democracy will help us find out whether more democracies will lead to more peace.Girard poses a challenge to the democratization for peace thesis, a thesis that serves as the basis for much of the foreign policy of the United States.1 For Girard, violence originates in desire. A subject desires what others desire and [End Page 45] therefore others are seen as roadblocks to that desire. This can turn violent. But the violence does not have to occur between the two subjects who have the same desire; it can be redirected to a surrogate victim who ends up being a scapegoat. If Girard’s theory is applied to the LDPT, the conclusion would be that nondemocracies are merely scapegoats for democracies so that order can be maintained in communities of democracies. Therefore, if the world becomes composed entirely of democracies, there will be no scapegoats left and democracies will fight one another.Such a theory of violence, and such a critique of the LDPT, is unfamiliar to mainstream political scientists.2 I do not suggest that Girard’s theory holds the answer to the problem of achieving perpetual peace, but the base assumption of Girard’s theory should be addressed by those who favor the LDPT. Girard begins from the idea that to achieve peace one must first understand the origin of violence. The LDPT, on the other hand, looks only at the conditions in which peace occurs, ignoring the origins of violence, thus potentially arriving at misleading conclusions.3 Applying Girard’s theory to the LDPT, and deriving alternative hypotheses from that application, will benefit all those who study war, as Girard provides a fresh perspective in the search for the causal mechanism underlying the empirical findings.Fortunately this article is not the first to apply Girard’s theory outside its traditional arenas. John Steele explains that expressive punishment can be explained in Girardian terms; R. G. Hamerton-Kelly argues that nuclear deterrence can be understood in Girardian terms; and Scott Thomas examines the current state of international affairs in a Girardian context.4 These studies can be used as a template by scholars trying to apply Girard’s theory to a field of study that has not previously used it. I will follow this template by first providing a critical examination of the current state of LDPT scholarship and then moving on to a discussion of Girard’s theory of violence. Section III contrasts Girard’s theory with other alternative explanations of war and peace in order to distinguish Girard’s theory from these explanations and to help clarify Girard’s theory.I. The Liberal Democratic Peace TheoryThe most widely accepted theory in international relations is the LDPT, even though empirical evidence supports both sides in the debate. However, most scholars agree that stable democracies do not go to war with other stable democracies.5 There are critics who suggest that the logic underlying the democratic [End Page 46] peace theory is flawed, and that exceptions to the theory can be found.6 The point of this article is not to contest the findings of those who support or refute the LDPT, but to illuminate one of its gravest shortcomings—the lack of a convincing causal explanation—and to provide direction to... (shrink)

Algebraic equations in the tradition of Descartes and Frans Van Schooten accompany Christiaan Huygens’s early work on collision, which later would be reorganized and presented as De motu corporum ex percussione. Huygens produced the equations at the same time as his announcement of his rejection of Descartes’s rules of collision. Never intended for publication, the equations appear to have been used as preliminary scaffolding on which to build his critiques of Descartes’s physics. Additionally, Huygens used algebraic equations of this form (...) to accurately predict the speeds of bodies after collision in experiments carried out at the Royal Society. Despite their deceptive simplicity, Huygens’s algebraic equations pose significant conceptual problems both mathematically and for their physical interpretation especially for negative speeds; they may very well have been the source of a new principle, the conservation of quantity of motion with direction. (shrink)

Rene Descartes (1596 – 1650) is considered the founder of modern philosophy. Profoundly influenced by the new physics and astronomy of Kepler and Galileo, Descartes was a scientist and mathematician whose most long-lasting contributions in science were the invention of Cartesian coordinates, the application of algebra to geometry, and the discovery of the law of refraction, what we now call Snell’s law.His most important books on philosophy were The discourse on method(1637) and The meditations(1642). Descartes’ writings display an exemplary degree (...) of clarity and an aversion to pedantry. I explore Descartes' break with Aristotle, but also shine a light on the intellectual continuity Descartes had with Aristotle's thought. I also draw attention to some overlooked but interesting possibilities for an experimental test of a dualistic theory of mind. (shrink)

Since the late 1970s, theologians have been attempting to integrate mimetic theory into different fields of theology, yet a distrust of mimetic theory persists in some theological camps. In" Rene Girard, Unlikely Apologist: Mimetic Theory and Fundamental Theology," Grant Kaplan brings mimetic theory into conversation with theology both to elucidate the relevance of mimetic theory for the discipline of fundamental theology and to understand the work of Rene Girard within a theological framework. Rather than focus on Christology or atonement theory (...) as the locus of interaction between Girard and theology, Kaplan centers his discussion on the apologetic quality of mimetic theory and the impact of mimetic theory on fundamental theology, the subdiscipline that grew to replace apologetics. His book explores the relation between Girard and fundamental theology in several keys. In one, it understands mimetic theory as a heuristic device that allows theological narratives and positions to become more intelligible and, by so doing, makes theology more persuasive. In another key, Kaplan shows how mimetic theory, when placed in dialogue with particular theologians, can advance theological discussion in areas where mimetic theory has seldom been invoked. On this level the book performs a dialogue with theology that both revisits earlier theological efforts and also demonstrates how mimetic theory brings valuable dimensions to questions of fundamental theology. "Grant Kaplan's" Rene Girard, Unlikely Apologist: Mimetic Theory and Fundamental Theology" is an accessible and original work advancing the discussion of Girard and theology. Kaplan claims mimetic theory for Catholic theology and shows how it can strengthen Catholic theology by providing a powerful apologetic. Immensely helpful, too, is his situating of Girard's work alongside formative theologians and other thinkers." Scott Cowdell, author of "Rene Girard and Secular Modernity: Christ, Culture, and Crisis" ". (shrink)

The problem of moral disagreement has been presented as an objection to contextualist semantics for ‘ought’, since it is not clear that contextualism can accommodate or give a convincing gloss of such disagreement. I argue that independently of our semantics, disagreements over ‘ought’ in non-cooperative contexts are best understood as indirect metalinguistic disputes, which is easily accommodated by contextualism. If this is correct, then rather than posing a problem for contextualism, the data from moral disagreements provides some reason to adopt (...) a semantics that allows contextual variance in the meanings of ‘ought’. (shrink)

I argue that inferences from highly probabilifying racial generalizations are not solely objectionable because acting on such inferences would be problematic, or they violate a moral norm, but because they violate a distinctively epistemic norm. They involve accepting a proposition when, given the costs of a mistake, one is not adequately justified in doing so. First I sketch an account of the nature of adequate justification—practical adequacy with respect to eliminating the ~p possibilities from one’s epistemic statespace. Second, I argue (...) that inferences based on demographic generalizations tend to disproportionately expose group members to the risks associated with mistakenly assuming stereotypical propositions, and so magnify the wrong involved in relying on such inferences without adequate justification. (shrink)

Several authors have recently suggested that moral factors and norms `encroach' on the epistemic, and because of salient parallels to pragmatic encroachment views in epistemology, these suggestions have been dubbed `moral encroachment views'. This paper distinguishes between variants of the moral encroachment thesis, pointing out how they address different problems, are motivated by different considerations, and are not all subject to the same objections. It also explores how the family of moral encroachment views compare to classical pragmatic encroachment accounts.

A regulative norm for permissible defense distinguishes the conditions under which we will hold defenders to be innocent of any wrongdoing from those in which we hold them responsible for assault or manslaughter. The norm must strike a fair balance between defenders' security, on the one hand, and other agents’ legitimate claim to live without fear of suffering mistaken defensive harm, on the other. Since agents must make defensive decisions under high pressure and on only partial information, they will sometimes (...) make mistakes. We have reason to want a norm that considers a mistake permissible when it was highly likely on the evidence that defense was proportionate and necessary to avert a threat. However, adopting an evidentialist norm under non-ideal conditions is treacherous business. I briefly survey empirical data suggesting that the type and extent of bias prevalent in the US renders a straightforward evidentialist norm unjust, and thus since the legal practice in the US relies on such a norm, we must explore avenues for reform. Preferably this will take the form of adopting a modified evidential norm, and I explore some promising options. If this proves impossible, however, then we have to accept a strict regulative norm (which does not consider any mistakes permissible), as the sole just alternative. (shrink)

In addition to protecting agents’ autonomy, consent plays a crucial social role: it enables agents to secure partners in valuable interactions that would be prohibitively morally risk otherwise. To do this, consent must be observable: agents must be able to track the facts about whether they have received a consent-based permission. I argue that this morally justifies a consent-practice on which communicating that one consents is sufficient for consent, but also generates robust constraints on what sorts of behaviors can be (...) taken as consent- communicating. (shrink)

I argue that the offense generation pattern of slurring terms parallels that of impoliteness behaviors, and is best explained by appeal to similar purely pragmatic mechanisms. In choosing to use a slurring term rather than its neutral counterpart, the speaker signals that she endorses the term. Such an endorsement warrants offense, and consequently slurs generate offense whenever a speaker's use demonstrates a contrastive preference for the slurring term. Since this explanation comes at low theoretical cost and imposes few constraints on (...) an account of the semantics of slurs, this suggests that we should not require semantic accounts to provide an independent explanation of the offense profile. (shrink)

Law-enforcement agencies are increasingly able to leverage crime statistics to make risk predictions for particular individuals, employing a form of inference that some condemn as violating the right to be “treated as an individual.” I suggest that the right encodes agents’ entitlement to a fair distribution of the burdens and benefits of the rule of law. Rather than precluding statistical prediction, it requires that citizens be able to anticipate which variables will be used as predictors and act intentionally to avoid (...) them. Furthermore, it condemns reliance on various indexes of distributive injustice, or unchosen properties, as evidence of law-breaking. (shrink)